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INTRODUCTION
In 2011, Rosemary Quinn was perusing the aisles of a
Walgreens store in New York when she happened upon a line of
joint health dietary supplements.1 The labels of the joint
supplements advertised that they contained glucosamine and
chondroitin, and that these supplements would “help rebuild
cartilage.”2 After reading and reviewing the representation on
the labels, Quinn purchased the products and subsequently took
them as directed.3 The product line of Walgreens’ “Glucosamine
Supplements consists of six different products that vary in
formulation, strength, and quantity.”4 Each of the Glucosamine
Supplements
contains
glucosamine
hydrochloride
and
chondroitin sulfate, although each product contains many other
ingredients as well.5
After consuming the product that she purchased, Quinn
realized that her cartilage had not been rebuilt as the label had
advertised.6
Accordingly, Quinn and another plaintiff
commenced an action on November 9, 2012, asserting claims
under New York and Connecticut consumer protection statutes.7
The named plaintiffs of the putative class action alleged that
Walgreens misrepresented its supplements’ abilities to “rebuild
cartilage,” and that the plaintiffs suffered economic injury as a
result of this deceptive business practice.8 In response to the
complaint, defendant Walgreens filed a motion to dismiss the
claims regarding five of the Glucosamine Supplements because
the named plaintiffs had only purchased one of the Walgreens
supplements.9 Walgreens alleged the named plaintiffs did not

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Quinn v. Walgreen Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 533, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 537 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 538.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 537, 538.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 541.
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have standing to assert claims against the other products in the
product line that the named plaintiffs had not, in fact,
purchased.10
This scenario—named plaintiffs of a putative consumer
protection class action seeking to assert claims relating to
products that they did not purchase themselves—has, in recent
years, become more frequent within the federal court system.11
However, in deciding the defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack
of standing, district courts across the country have been anything
but uniform.12 This Note analyzes the various district court
decisions that have addressed this issue and proposes a test for
the uniform adjudication of such scenarios.
Before the adoption of state consumer protection statutes in
the 1970s and 1980s, there was very limited protection against
fraud and abuse in the marketplace.13 The Federal Trade
Commission Act14 (“FTC Act”), which had prohibited unfair or
deceptive acts or practices since 1938, was largely ineffective in
policing such behavior.15 Accordingly, defrauded consumers were
often preempted from bringing suit because of small-print
disclaimers on the products they purchased.16 The only remedies
consumers had were actions for common law fraud or unjust
enrichment, which carry high burdens of proof, including the
seller’s state of mind at the time of the purchase.17 Additionally,
very few states had provisions reimbursing consumers for
attorneys’ fees.18 The lack of reimbursement meant that few
attorneys would take these cases and the consumer would,
consequently, rarely be made whole.19
In recognition of the deficiencies in our legal system for the
protection of consumers and the inefficiency of the FTC in
protecting against businesses’ deceptive practices, a consumer
10

Id.
See Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889–91 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (describing numerous cases in which similar scenarios have taken place).
12
Id.
13
Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Report on
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW
CENTER INC. 5 (2009).
14
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
15
Carter, supra note 13, at 5.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 6.
19
Id.
11
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protection movement emerged, resulting in the passage of
consumer protection legislation by every state.20 Today, the state
statutes vary in the extent of the protections they afford the
consumer. Specifically, the statutes vary in their substantive
prohibitions and the scope of the remedial powers they allot to
state enforcement agencies or consumers.21 The states used the
FTC Act and several model statutes to draft legislation that
brought consumer justice to the state, local, and individual
levels.22 The statutes empowered state agencies and individual
consumers to bring actions to remedy unfair and deceptive
practices.23
In addition to their basic protections for the individual
consumer, unfair and deceptive practices statutes are
advantageous because of their beneficial effect on the
marketplace.24
By working to eliminate fraudulent and
predatory practices, such statutes disincentivize these behaviors
and, consequently, promote fair competition among honest
merchants.25 Although the penalties are primarily civil in
nature, these statutes allow for criminal penalties for extreme
violations.26 They allow state enforcement agencies, such as a
state’s Attorney General, to obtain orders prohibiting a merchant
from engaging in certain unfair or deceptive behavior, or impose
civil monetary penalties for violations.27 The statutes are most
effective, however, in allowing the individual consumer to seek
remedies.28 Such remedies are usually the return of payments or
compensation for loss, an injunction preventing the company
from continuing to use the deceptive practice, and, in most states,
the reimbursement of attorneys’ fees.29

20
Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse
by Requiring Plaintiffs To Allege Reliance As an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1, 14 (2006). Some states passed more than one statute. Carter, supra note
13, at 6.
21
Carter, supra note 13, at 6.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
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For years, consumer protection was largely limited to the
state court systems. However, with legislation designed to
broaden a litigant’s access to the federal courts, Congress
diverted numerous consumer protection suits to the federal
arena.30
Following Congress’ enactment of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 200531 (“CAFA”), there has been a dramatic increase in
consumer protection class action litigation brought in the federal
courts.32 This surge occurred because CAFA furnishes the
federal courts with jurisdiction to hear suits arising from both
federal consumer protection statutes, as well as state consumer
protection class action claims with diversity of citizenship.33 In
enacting CAFA, Congress sought to remedy some of the abuses of
the class action system—namely, forum shopping by plaintiffs in
state courts with reputations for hostility toward business
defendants and class settlements that benefitted counsel more
than the class members themselves.34 The legislation has
prompted the federal courts’ adjudication of claims that were
traditionally reserved for the state courts.35
This new era of federal consumer class actions has been met
with certain procedural inconsistencies in how the federal courts
have adjudicated these consumer protection claims. One such
inconsistency continues to be exacerbated by the recent influx of
consumer protection class actions.36 The issue arises in instances
where the named plaintiffs in putative consumer protection class
actions seek to assert claims relating to products that they
themselves did not purchase. Because the named plaintiffs did
not purchase the products over which they assert claims,
defendants move to dismiss the claims against the unpurchased
products for lack of standing.37 The question is: Should the
standing of a named plaintiff in a putative consumer protection
class action to assert claims relating to products he or she did not

30

See infra Part I.B.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012).
32
See infra Part I.B.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
The Class Action Fairness Act, Five Years Later, MAYER BROWN (Apr. 12,
2010), http://www.mayerbrown.com/news/The-Class-Action-Fairness-Act-five-yearslater-04-12-2010/.
37
See, e.g., Quinn v. Walgreen Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 533, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
31
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purchase be addressed at the motion to dismiss stage, or is this a
question more appropriately addressed at the Rule 23 class
certification stage of litigation?
This Note analyzes the two approaches federal courts have
taken when addressing this question. The first approach is to
hold that named plaintiffs can never assert claims relating to
products that they themselves did not purchase, and therefore,
such claims should not survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.38
The second approach is to hold that the question of whether a
named plaintiff may assert a claim relating to unpurchased
products is a question better suited for resolution during the Rule
23 class certification stage of the litigation.39 Accordingly, such
an approach denies a defendant’s motion to dismiss and reserves
decision on the issue of standing until class certification.
Looking at the history and rationale underlying consumer
protection statutes and the purpose of the class action
mechanism itself, this Note concludes that a named plaintiff’s
standing to assert claims against unpurchased products in a
putative consumer protection class action is a question properly
addressed at the Rule 23 class certification stage of the litigation.
Part I discusses the history of, and purpose underlying, state
consumer protection statutes, followed by an overview of modern
standing doctrine and its relation to consumer protection actions
and class actions generally.
Part II discusses the conflicting cases involving named
plaintiffs who seek to assert claims relating to products they did
not purchase that have been decided by district courts across the
country, highlighting the two distinct approaches courts have
taken to deal with this procedural issue. District courts adopting
the first approach have determined that a named plaintiff can
never assert claims over products that they did not purchase.
The second approach generally holds that whether named
plaintiffs have standing to assert claims relating to products they
themselves did not purchase is a question that must be
addressed at the Rule 23 class certification stage of the litigation.
However, the federal courts’ application of the second approach is
mired with inconsistency and confusion.

38
39

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
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Part III concludes that the most appropriate solution to the
procedural issue is an adoption of the second approach. This
conclusion is based on the United States’ implementation of
consumer protection statutes, the history and policy underlying
such statutes, and the relationship between modern standing
doctrine and the class action mechanism itself. However, due to
inconsistency in how courts have applied the second approach,
this Part seeks to formulate a response which remedies such
inconsistency and creates a uniform test for addressing the issue.
This Note determines that whether a named plaintiff has
standing to assert claims relating to unpurchased products is a
question of class standing and is therefore a question for the Rule
23 class certification stage of litigation. However, in certain
situations, a named plaintiff’s claims against unpurchased
products should not survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, this Note proposes a test to determine when the
claim should survive. At the motion to dismiss stage of litigation,
a named consumer protection class action plaintiff’s claims
relating to products purchased by unnamed members of the
putative class should survive defendant’s motion when there is
“sufficient similarity” between the unpurchased products and the
product plaintiff actually purchased.40 Such a determination,
calling for an analysis into the similarity of claims, is better
suited for the Rule 23 class certification stage of litigation than
the motion to dismiss stage. Federal district courts should
presume sufficient similarity between the products (i) when the
product over which standing is sought is of the same product line
as that product which was actually purchased by the named
plaintiff; (ii) when the products have common ingredients or
components and such ingredients or components are the primary
or material selling points of the products; and (iii) when the
plaintiff does not allege injury based solely on the alleged
misrepresentations, but rather on the diminution in value
resulting from the product defect that exists in all products, such
that if certification is granted, the proposed class would include
plaintiffs with personal standing to raise the claims.

40
Some courts have used the language “substantially similar.” See, e.g.,
Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921–922 (N.D. Cal 2012). For the
purposes of this Note, the author uses the terminology “sufficiently similar.”
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Without the adoption of this rule, inconsistent application of
modern standing doctrine to consumer protection class actions
will continue. Accordingly, a steadfast application of the rule in
consumer protection class actions is necessary to preserve the
original policy underlying consumer protection statutes, which
sought to enable the individual consumer, wronged by unfair and
deceitful marketing tactics, to bring an action directly against
the offending business.
I.
A.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

The History and Purpose of Consumer Protection Statutes in
the United States

Consumer rights were not a major concern within the United
States until the latter part of the twentieth century. The Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) was created in 1914 and was tasked
with regulating “[u]nfair methods of competition” among
businesses.41
However, the FTC’s mission was limited to
protecting against “unfair methods” that were injurious to the
“business of a competitor.”42 The FTC, therefore, was largely
limited in its ability to protect the general public, and instead
was focused primarily on inter-business regulation.43
It was not until 1938 that Congress expanded the scope of
the FTC’s authority to protect consumers from “unfair or
deceptive” trade practices under the FTC Act.44 Congress’s intent
was for the FTC Act to protect against both “inadvertent or
uniformed advertising” and “vicious” advertising.45 Although
Congress succeeded in expanding the scope of the FTC’s
authority, the FTC failed to adequately exercise its enforcement
powers to protect consumers.46 This changed in the 1960s when
the American consumer protection movement finally gained
momentum.47

41

15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 11.
43
Id.
44
15 U.S.C. § 45 ; see also Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 12 n.68 (discussing the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment).
45
H.R. Rep. No. 75-1613, at 5 (1937).
46
Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 12.
47
Id. at 10–11. The FTC’s ineffectiveness inspired a strong movement within
state legislatures to enact consumer protection legislation, whereby, beginning in
42
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By the 1970s—due in large part to the FTC’s inability to
protect consumers and the passage of model statutes—almost
every state had enacted consumer protection legislation.48 The
state legislation was designed to better the public enforcement of
consumer protection by employing state attorney generals to
handle what was originally the FTC’s responsibility.49 The final
hurdle in establishing consumer rights was adopting private
causes of action for damages, which, by 1973, the majority of the
states had done.50
Today, every state has some form of consumer protection
legislation.51 While the FTC Act prohibits unfair business
practices, it only permits the FTC to bring suit.52 Accordingly,
consumers must rely on state consumer protection statutes and
other federal consumer protection statutes for any private causes
of action.53 These statutes generally (i) enable private citizens to
sue defendants who allegedly engage in unfair practices;
(ii) permit plaintiffs to request the injunction of defendants’
harmful practices; (iii) provide plaintiffs with a low bar for
causation; and (iv) contain provisions to punish the defendants.54
The overall purpose of consumer protection statutes is the
regulation of business practices to ensure the proper disclosure of
information and enable a more equitably balanced relationship
between consumers and businesses.55 Sometimes referred to as
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (“UDAP”) statutes, they
are the main lines of defense protecting consumers from
predatory, deceptive, and unscrupulous business practices,56 and
the 1960s, three separate model statutes emerged. Id. at 14; see id. at 18 (analyzing
the model statutes).
48
Id. at 18.
49
Id. at 18–19.
50
Id. at 20 n.138.
51
Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection
Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010); Carter,
supra note 13, at 5.
52
15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
53
Examples of federal consumer protection statutes include the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Truth in Lending
Act. Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION, (last visited June 30, 2015), http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes.
54
Meaghan Millan, Note, The Justiciability of State Consumer Protection
Claims in Federal Courts: A Study of Named Plaintiffs Who Cease Using the
Disputed Product yet Seek Injunctive Relief, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3565, 3569 (2013).
55
21 C.J.S. Credit Reporting Agencies § 34 (2015).
56
Carter, supra note 13, at 5.
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“faulty and dangerous goods.”57 By enacting these statutes, state
legislatures sought to remedy any injuries a private citizen
suffered because of deceptive marketing.58
These statutes provide consumers with a remedy for
deceptive trade practices, without the onus of the burden of proof
or the numerous defenses that are typically encountered in
common law fraud or breach of warranty actions.59 Specifically,
these statutes facilitate a plaintiff’s ability to bring suit by
providing the plaintiff with a more lenient standard for proving
causation.60
The statutes are also designed to encourage private
enforcement of their provisions. Consumer protection statutes
generally seek to eliminate deceptive business practices by
(i) compensating the victim for his or her actual loss;
(ii) punishing the wrongdoer with awards of treble damages; and
(iii) incentivizing attorneys, by means of counsel fee provisions,
to take cases involving minor loss to an individual.61 The most
notable feature is the consumer’s ability to bring suit directly
against a company that is allegedly using deceptive business
practices.62 Additionally, the consumer may also request that the
court enjoin the company from further engaging in such
deceptive practices.63 This remedy demonstrates how the statute
is designed to affect the wider group of consumers, other than the
individual consumer, that purchases or may purchase the
product after viewing the deceptive advertisement.64
Finally, while the statutes provide for compensatory relief,
the injuries caused by the deceptive behavior these statutes seek
to prohibit are generally miniscule.65 However, in addition to
being compensatory, consumer protection statutes are generally
punitive in nature. Accordingly, consumers will often recover
punitive and treble damages should they prevail in their suits.66
57

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 383 (10th ed. 2014).
Millan, supra note 54, at 3569.
59
Id. at 3570.
60
See id. (noting that some state statutes do not require plaintiffs to prove
reliance on the deceptive business practice and some states do not require that
consumers be misled).
61
21 C.J.S. Credit Reporting Agencies § 34 n.6 (2015).
62
Millan, supra note 54, at 3570.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Carter, supra note 13, at 20.
66
Id. at 20–21.
58
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Class Actions and Consumer Protection Statutes

Class actions have become a popular means of litigating
consumer protection claims.67
The prevailing plaintiffs in
consumer fraud class actions are entitled to recover their costs
and reasonable attorneys’ fees.68 Class actions are frequently
used to bring both federal and state claims against businesses for
alleged unfair practices.69 Several federal consumer protection
statutes specifically provide for class actions;70 class actions may
also be brought under federal statutes that simply address
consumer protection.71 Class actions may also be brought for
violations of state consumer protection acts and unfair or
deceptive business practice legislation.72
Class actions are particularly efficient in the consumer
protection context because the unfair and deceptive practices at
issue are generally perpetrated against a large number of
consumers.73 Additionally, because the injuries suffered by
consumers who seek to invoke the protections of consumer
protection statutes are generally small, class actions allow “the
claims to be aggregated into a single action against a defendant
that has allegedly caused harm.”74
By aggregating small
damages, the class action mechanism allows consumers to deal
with the economic reality that “each individual loss is likely to be
too small to merit the cost of pursuing it” individually.75 The
class action is, therefore, an effective means of remedying
small-scale fraud affecting a wide number of people.

67
Chris Cole, The Case of the Rise in Consumer Class-Action Suits, and What It
Means, ADVERTISING AGE (Apr. 23, 2012), http://adage.com/article/guestcolumnists/case-rise-consumer-class-action-suits-means/234232/.
68
2 JOHN F.X. PELOSO ET AL., BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 19:107 (3d ed.
2014).
69
Id.
70
See, e.g., Truth in Lending-Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012) (allowing
class actions for civil liability).
71
See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012) (regulating warranties on consumer products).
72
2 JOHN F.X. PELOSO ET AL., supra note 68.
73
Carter, supra note 13, at 19.
74
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
75
Id.
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In 2005, in an attempt to remedy some of the abuses of class
action litigation,76 Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act
(“CAFA”).77 CAFA altered class action practice in the state and
federal courts by changing the rules for federal diversity
jurisdiction and removal, restricting the practice of coupon
settlements, and changing the procedures for settling class
actions in federal courts.78 Congress reasoned that by expanding
federal diversity jurisdiction to encompass interstate class
actions, more class actions would be funneled into federal court,
where any abuse would be diminished.79 Congress’s main goal
was to reduce forum shopping by plaintiffs in state courts with
reputations for hostility to business defendants or reputations for
“rubber-stamping coupon settlements under which the class
counsel—not the class members—received the lion’s share of the
benefit.”80
Since CAFA’s enactment, class actions have
increasingly proceeded in federal court.81 Therefore, consistent
with congressional intent, CAFA has proven to be an invaluable
tool, permitting consumers to file class actions in federal court.
1.

Typical Consumer Protection Class Actions in Federal Court

A typical consumer fraud class action is brought in federal
court pursuant to either a federal consumer protection statute
that provides for a class action,82 or a state consumer protection
statute where there is minimal diversity among the parties and

76
See generally Richard O. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation? The Use
and Abuse of Class Actions in International Dispute Resolution, 37 TORT & INS. L.J.
999 (2002) (discussing the abuses of class action litigation).
77
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
78
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:13 (5th ed. 2015).
CAFA expanded jurisdiction for diversity class actions by creating jurisdiction for
classes with more than 100 class members if (i) at least one class member is diverse
from at least one defendant and (ii) more than five million dollars in total is in
controversy, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
79
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 78, § 6:14.
80
The Class Action Fairness Act, Five Years Later, MAYER BROWN (Apr. 12,
2010) http://www.mayerbrown.com/news/The-Class-Action-Fairness-Act-five-yearslater-04-12-2010/.
81
Id. Class actions that are originally filed in federal courts have nearly tripled;
diversity removals from state courts have also increased. Id.; see also Emery G. Lee
III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439,
1723 (2008) (noting the increase was due primarily to increases in consumer class
actions filed in, or removed to, federal court).
82
See supra text accompanying notes 70–72.
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all of CAFA’s preconditions are satisfied.83 Such class actions
typically involve a large number of claimants who allege that
certain widespread business or financial practices violate their
rights as consumers.84 The amount of damages that each class
member seeks is generally small, usually because (i) consumer
fraud statutes that contain aggregate damages limitations limit
the amount each individual class plaintiff can recover and
(ii) plaintiffs often bring consumer fraud actions to stop
defendant’s violative conduct, in which case, the recovery of
damages is not the primary objective of the suit.85 Because
unfair or deceptive practices generally do not substantially injure
individual consumers, given that the injury is usually the
purchase price of the product, consumer protection statutes allow
claimants to unite in class actions. The effect is that such
miniscule individual injury, when multiplied by the thousands of
affected consumers, will equate to substantial monetary value
and will thereby allow the individual consumer to stymie the
practice of the major corporation.86
While consumer protection class actions are increasingly
more prevalent in federal courts, class action plaintiffs continue
to face obstacles in successfully adjudicating these actions. For
class actions generally, proper definition of the class is very
important. This means that courts will reject overly broad
pleadings, requiring that the class be defined specifically.87
Additionally, a class action must satisfy the prerequisites
established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a):
numerosity,88 commonality,89 typicality,90 and adequacy of

83

See supra note 78 (discussing CAFA’s preconditions).
2 JOHN F.X. PELOSO ET AL., supra note 68.
85
Id.
86
See generally id.
87
Id. Courts have rejected overly broad definitions of the class, such as “every
consumer injured by defendant’s unfair business practices.” Id.; see Forman v. Data
Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (rejecting as overly broad the
definition of a class that would include “all residents and businesses who have
received unsolicited facsimile advertisements”) (emphasis omitted).
88
The class must be so numerous that joinder of all members individually would
be “impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
89
There must be questions of law or fact common to the class. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a)(2).
90
The claims or defenses of the class representative must be typical of the
claims or defenses of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
84
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representation.91 The intrinsic nature of the consumer fraud
class action ensures that numerosity is not generally an issue for
a plaintiff seeking certification of a class.92 The requirements of
commonality and typicality are also not problematic, because in
the consumer protection context the defendant’s standardized
conduct is the basis of the claim.93 Accordingly, the claims of the
class members do not necessarily have to be identical, as long as
they were injured by the same conduct of the defendant. Finally,
to satisfy adequacy of representation, the claims of the class
representative must not conflict with those of the other class
members.94 If these four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied,
then most consumer fraud plaintiffs will seek class certification
under Rule 23(b)(3).95 For a Rule 23(b)(3) class action to be
certified, the named plaintiffs must show that the common issues
predominate the individual issues and that the class action
mechanism is the superior means of resolving the claims.96
For the purposes of this Note, the cases discussed will be
decisions addressing a defendant’s motion to dismiss. In these
cases, named plaintiffs seek to assert consumer protection claims
against products that the named plaintiffs did not themselves
purchase, but which were purchased by members of the putative
class. Accordingly, these cases deal with plaintiffs who bring
claims against a defendant alleging violations of consumer
protection statutes, with the intent of certifying a class. The
defendant’s motion to dismiss occurs early in the litigation,
before the named plaintiff has an opportunity to move for Rule 23
class certification. Therefore, in the cases that are addressed, the

91
The person representing the class must be able to fairly and adequately
protect the interests of all members of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
92
In consumer protection class actions, the alleged injury generally relates to
products that have been purchased by large numbers of individuals.
93
2 JOHN F.X. PELOSO ET AL., supra note 68.
94
Id.
95
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (“[T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings
include: (A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.”)
96
2 JOHN F.X. PELOSO ET AL., supra note 68.
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main obstacle facing the named plaintiffs seeking to establish a
class is a Rule 12(b)(1)97 motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Such a motion asks the court to
dismiss the complaint, with the defendant typically arguing that
the plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims relating to products
or services that he or she did not purchase or use. To understand
this argument, it is important to analyze modern standing
doctrine and its relation to class actions generally and consumer
protection actions in particular.
C.

Modern Standing Doctrine in the Class Action Context

In determining whether named plaintiffs have standing to
pursue claims arising from putative class members’ purchases of
products that the named plaintiffs themselves did not purchase,
it is necessary to dissect contemporary standing doctrine into
several parts.
Namely, this Note addresses (i) Article III
standing, (ii) statutory standing, and (iii) class standing.
Article III standing is derived from the pages of the United
States Constitution. It “identif[ies] those disputes which are
appropriately resolved through the judicial process.”98
To
establish Article III standing, the Supreme Court has delineated:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent,” not “conjectural” or
“hypothetical.” Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury
has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be
“likely,” as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will
be “redressed by a favorable decision.”99

The party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish such
elements and because the elements are “an indispensable part of
the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported . . . with the
manner and degree of evidence required at successive stages of
the litigation.”100

97

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
99
Id. at 560–61 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
100
Id. at 561.
98
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Article III standing can be satisfied relatively easily in
consumer protection class actions because economic injury is
generally sufficient as a form of injury-in-fact to satisfy the first
element of standing.101 Take, for example, a consumer who
purchases a product based on a corporation’s deceptive
marketing of that product. If the consumer relies upon some
representation made on the product’s label, and alleges that the
representation turned out to be deceptive, thereby causing the
consumer injury, the consumer has established a sufficient
economic injury for the purposes of clearing Article III standing’s
injury bar.
The concept of statutory standing applies to legislatively
created causes of action and “it asks whether a statute creating a
private right of action authorizes a particular plaintiff to avail
herself of that right of action.”102 Essentially, with statutory
standing, the question is whether the plaintiff in a particular
lawsuit is the person that Congress intended would recover
through the creation of the statutory cause of action. Statutory
standing is satisfied if the consumer purchased the product that
has given rise to the litigation and was injured monetarily as a
result.103
Class standing is a more elusive concept.104 This subset of
contemporary standing doctrine applies exclusively to the class
action mechanism. Accordingly, where Article III and statutory
standing are addressed at the motion to dismiss stage of the
litigation, class standing is addressed at the Rule 23 class
certification stage. The inherent nature of a class action suit,
with a plaintiff as a representative of a class, creates standing
issues. These issues occur primarily because “[i]n a properly
certified class action, the named plaintiffs regularly litigate not
only their own claims, but also claims of other class members
based on transactions in which the named plaintiffs played no

101
See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 432–33 (1998) (noting that
economic injury is sufficient to satisfy the Article III standing requirement of
injury-in-fact).
102
Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 OKLA. L.
REV. 89, 91 (2009).
103
See id. at 94–95 (discussing what a plaintiff asserting statutory standing
must establish with regard to his or her claim).
104
See Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance
Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 768 (1st Cir. 2011) (“The issue looks straightforward and one
would expect it to be well settled; neither assumption is entirely true.”).
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part.”105
Accordingly, class standing refers to the named
plaintiff’s ability to serve as the representative of the members of
the putative class. This analysis is wholly independent from the
inquiry into the named plaintiff’s standing to bring his individual
claims.106
Because both standing and Rule 23(a) aim to
determine whether the proper party is before the court, they
appear to be related, but they are very different concepts.107
When a named plaintiff lacks individual standing, the court must
dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Article III standing.
However, when a named plaintiff has individual standing, the
court should proceed to the Rule 23 criteria to determine if the
plaintiff may represent the class.108
When a named plaintiff seeks to litigate harms that are not
identical to the ones he or she suffered, but which other class
members suffered, the situation generates confusion.109
In
addressing such a situation, some courts simply find that the
class representative cannot pursue the class members’ claims
because he or she did not personally suffer the class members’
injuries, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff has satisfied
the individual standing requirement.110 Such courts effectively
confuse Article III and class standing by addressing class
standing prematurely, before class certification. Other courts
have found that the class representative has standing to pursue
his or her own claims, and that any other claims should be
analyzed according to class certification, not standing.111 Such an

105

Id. at 769.
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 408 n.4 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If
named class plaintiffs have standing, the standing of the class members is satisfied
by the requirements for class certification.” (citing 1 H. NEWBERG & A. CONTE,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.01, p. 2–3 (3d ed. 1992))). One court has recently
defined class standing, holding:
[I]n a putative class action, a plaintiff has class standing if he plausibly
alleges (1) that he “personally has suffered some actual . . . injury as a
result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,” and (2) that such
conduct implicates “the same set of concerns” as the conduct alleged to have
caused injury to other members of the putative class by the same
defendants.
NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145, 162
(2d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
107
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 78, § 2:6, n.0.50.
108
See id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
106
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approach allows courts to then analyze the class representative
at the class certification stage and thereby determine whether
the representative’s claims are sufficiently typical or
representative of the class members’ claims.112
The inconsistent approaches federal courts use when
applying standing doctrine in the class action context has only
been exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s lack of direction. The
Court has held that a plaintiff does not have Article III standing
unless there is a showing that “he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of some putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant . . . [i]t is not enough that the conduct of
which the plaintiff complains will injure someone.”113
Additionally, the Court has explicitly noted, “Nor does a plaintiff
who has been subject to injurious conduct of one kind possess by
virtue of that injury the necessary stake in litigating conduct of
another kind, although similar, to which he has not been
subject.”114 The Court has acknowledged that there is “tension”
in prior case law “as to whether ‘variation’ between (1) a named
plaintiff’s claims and (2) the claims of putative class members ‘is
a matter of Article III standing . . . or whether it goes to the
propriety of class certification pursuant to” Rule 23.115
Accordingly, the Court’s inability to address the issue of
“standing versus adequacy” has resulted in inconsistent court
decisions.116
Several circuits have held that the class action mechanism
should be liberally interpreted and administered.117 These courts
have rejected the strict application of standing doctrine, which

112

Id.
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v.
Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
114
Blum, 457 U.S. at 999.
115
NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145,
160 (2d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
263 & n.15 (2003)).
116
See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 263.
117
See, e.g., Payton v. Cnty. of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 680–81 (7th Cir. 2002)
(finding the named plaintiffs, who were only injured by two counties themselves,
were entitled to maintain the class action claims against seventeen other counties
that had implemented the same state statute in the same way); Fallick v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 424 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding the named
plaintiff, who only participated in one ERISA plan, could represent a class against
all of the defendant’s ERISA plans when the essence of the complaint was a practice
present in all of the plans).
113
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provides that “no defendant may be sued unless a named plaintiff
has a . . . claim against that defendant.”118 Instead, these courts
reason that even defendants against whom no named plaintiff
has a claim should be included in a class action if the claims
against them are “essentially of the same character as the claim
against a properly named defendant.”119 Such courts believe this
issue should be dealt with during the Rule 23 stage of the
litigation.120
Accordingly, when a named plaintiff brings a consumer
protection claim intending to certify a class, at the motion to
dismiss stage, all that matters is whether or not the plaintiff can
satisfy Article III and statutory standing requirements. This
holds true because class standing is not implicated until the
actual class certification stage of the litigation, which occurs
later. If the named plaintiff adequately alleges individualized
injury, then any claims relating to products the plaintiff has not
purchased should be analyzed under the Rule 23 class
certification prerequisites. Although the case law is far from
clear, it is apparent that weighing the similarity of a named
plaintiff’s claim with that of a class member is an action that
invokes the same analysis required by Rule 23(a).
II. THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
Recently, district courts across the country have addressed
the procedural issue of whether named plaintiffs in a putative
consumer protection class action could survive a motion to
dismiss.
These same courts also addressed whether such
plaintiffs have standing to pursue claims arising from the
putative class members’ purchases of products that the named
plaintiffs had not purchased themselves. This Part discusses the
conflicting decisions of the courts. In particular, district courts
have formulated two different tests with contradictory answers to
this question. Under the first approach, the named plaintiff does
not have standing, so any claims relating to the unpurchased
products must be dismissed.121 Alternatively, courts adopting the
118
Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance
Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 770 (1st Cir. 2011).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
See, e.g., Padilla v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 11 C 7686, 2013 WL 195769,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2013); Pearson v. Target Corp., No. 11 CV 7972, 2012 WL
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second approach have denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss and
held that whether or not a named plaintiff can assert claims
related to unpurchased products is a question addressed at the
Rule 23 class certification stage of the litigation. However, courts
adopting this second approach have complicated the issue by
adopting inconsistent tests within their opinions. Some have
held that the named plaintiff can have standing over the
unnamed class members’ products only so long as the products
and alleged misrepresentations are “substantially similar.”122
Other courts have held that the question is one for a Rule 23
class certification analysis but do not inquire as to whether the
products or misrepresentations are “sufficiently similar.”123
The effect of this disagreement among the districts is that in
a putative class action, in certain instances, a plaintiff in one
state will have standing over products he or she did not
purchase, whereas the same plaintiff in a different state will not.
Such inconsistencies in the federal courts are detrimental to
consumers who look to the judicial system to remedy injuries
they have suffered due to unfair business practices and are,
thereby, at odds with the policies underlying consumer protection
laws. Additionally, such inconsistency was the problem that the
Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) originally sought to
remedy—forum shopping resulting from different jurisdictions
having more favorable laws.124 Accordingly, a uniform approach
must be implemented so that this inconsistency within the
district courts is not exploited.

7761986, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2012); Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., No. C 11–05403
JW, 2012 WL 2847575, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012); Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co.,
No. C 11–05188 SI, 2012 WL 5458396, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012); Carrea v.
Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 10–01044 JSW, 2011 WL 159380, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 10, 2011), aff’d, 475 F. App’x 113 (9th Cir. 2012).
122
See generally Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921–22 (N.D. Cal
2012) (collecting cases); Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 881,
889–91 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (same).
123
See generally In re Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. All Natural Litigation, No. 12-MD2413 (RRM), 2013 WL 4647512, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013).
124
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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A Named Plaintiff Does Not Have Standing

In addressing this issue, the Northern District of Illinois has
emphatically announced that a plaintiff does not have standing
to assert claims relating to products purchased by unnamed
putative class members and, accordingly, a defendant’s motion to
dismiss must be granted.
In Padilla v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,125 plaintiff Ray Padilla
brought suit alleging violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act (“ICFA”).126 Padilla alleged that Costco Wholesale, Inc.
(“Costco”) marketed and sold the Kirkland Signature Extra
Strength Glucosamine HCL line of joint-health dietary
supplements (“Kirkland Products”) in stores and online.127 The
Kirkland Products named in Padilla’s complaint included two
products with differing ingredients.128 Both products represented
that if consumers took the supplements, they would experience
optimum mobility while, at the same time, building cartilage and
protecting their joints.129 Padilla alleged that in March 2011, he
purchased one of the Kirkland Products from Costco, relying on
the advertisement from the product’s label, and that his joint
health was not improved as a result.130
The court held Padilla failed to state an ICFA claim as to the
other Kirkland Product because he had not purchased it and,
accordingly, did not have standing.131 The court looked to the
ICFA’s definition of “consumer,”132 and found that because
Padilla had not purchased the product, he “ha[d] not sustained
any actual damage”133 and did not fit within the definition.134
The court rejected Padilla’s argument that “whether he is
‘entitled to represent purchasers of Glucosamine Chondroitin
does not turn on [his] standing to sue . . . but rather, on whether,

125

2012 WL 2397012.
Id. at *1.
127
Id.
128
Id. at *3.
129
Id. at *1.
130
Id. at *1–2.
131
Id. at *2–3.
132
See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1(e) (2007) (“[A]ny person who purchases or
contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his
trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.”) (emphasis
added).
133
Padilla, 2012 WL 2397012, at *2.
134
Id. at *3.
126
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under Rule 23(a), his claims are common and typical of
purchasers of all of Costco’s Products.’ ”135 In determining
whether Padilla could assert claims against the products he did
not purchase, the court relied upon the fact that the two products
at issue had different product formulations and different
labels.136 The court noted Padilla could not use “the class-action
device to ‘predicate standing on injury which he does not share’
with respect to” the product not purchased.137 The court reasoned
that a named plaintiff cannot “piggy-back on the injuries of the
unnamed class members,” to acquire standing “through the back
door of a class action.”138
Accordingly, the court granted
defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the product Padilla did not
purchase.139
The Northern District of Illinois has adopted a strict
interpretation of the standing doctrine and its relation to
consumer protection class actions.140 The court’s refusal to allow
the named plaintiff to assert claims against any product other
than that which directly harmed the individual plaintiff
demonstrates the court’s constrictive application of the standing
doctrine. The increase in consumer protection class action
litigation in federal court has ensured that this issue is
increasingly present; the Northern District of Illinois is already
considering another case with identical facts.141

135

Id.
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. (quoting Payton v. Cnty. of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2002)).
139
Id.
140
See Pearson v. Target Corp., 2012 WL 7761986, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2012)
(finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert claims against products he did
not purchase by holding that the plaintiff “[was] mixing up the concept [of] standing
with Rule 23 class representation” and asking, “[H]ow could [the plaintiff] possibly
have been injured by representations made on a product he did not buy?”).
141
See Second Amended Class Action Complaint, Guilin v. Walgreens Co., No.
11-CV-07763 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2012), 2012 WL 6045111. The standing issue has
been briefed and the parties are waiting for the ruling of the court. Additionally,
another district has agreed with the Northern District of Illinois, holding that a
named plaintiff did not have standing to assert claims relating to products that were
not purchased by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., No. C 11-05403
JW, 2012 WL 2847575, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012) (“[W]hen a plaintiff asserts
claims based both on products that she purchased and products that she did not
purchase, claims relating to products not purchased must be dismissed for lack of
standing.”).
136
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The Question Is Better Suited for a Rule 23 Class
Certification Analysis

Whereas some district courts have held a plaintiff cannot
have standing to assert claims relating to products that he or she
did not purchase, other district courts have held that such a
determination must be made at the Rule 23 class certification
stage of the litigation.142 However, in adopting this approach to
the procedural issue, district courts have not been uniform and
the inconsistent decisions have created a confusing legal
landscape. Namely, there are two applications of the second
approach. The first application finds that the named plaintiff
can have standing over the unnamed class members’ products
and survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as the
products and alleged misrepresentations are “sufficiently
similar.”143 The second application of the second approach agrees
that the question is one for a Rule 23 class certification analysis,
but does not inquire as to whether the products or
misrepresentations are “sufficiently similar.”144
The vast “majority of the courts that have carefully analyzed
th[is] question hold that a plaintiff may have standing to assert
claims for unnamed class members based on products he or she
did not purchase so long as the products and alleged
misrepresentations are substantially similar.”145 The district
courts employing this test look at the products that the named
plaintiff is seeking to assert claims against and the alleged
misrepresentations they contain, and compare them to the
product and misrepresentation that the named plaintiff actually
purchased and relied upon.146

142

Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 881, 891 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
144
See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
145
Brown, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
146
See id. at 891–92 (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to bring claims
against unpurchased products because, although the products within the brand were
dissimilar, the alleged misrepresentations were uniform, and standing is determined
by considering “whether there are substantial similarities in the accused products
and whether there are similar misrepresentations across product lines such that
Plaintiffs’ injury is sufficiently similar to that suffered by class members who
purchased other accused products”); Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., Nos.
C-11-2910 EMC, C-11 3164 EMC, 2012 WL 2990766, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012)
(holding “the critical inquiry seems to be whether there is sufficient similarity
between the products purchased and not purchased,” and finding sufficient
143
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In the courts’ comparison, “where product composition is less
important, the cases turn on whether the alleged
misrepresentations are sufficiently similar across product
lines.”147 For example, in Koh v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,148 the
court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.149
There, plaintiff was allowed to assert claims relating to a label
suggesting an unpurchased Shout brand stain remover was
environmentally friendly.150 The court found that the purchased
product, Windex brand glass cleaner, was produced by the same
company and bore a label that was identical to the unpurchased
product.151 The court noted that “there is no brightline rule that
different product lines cannot be covered by a single class,” and
highlighted that the plaintiff was allegedly directly injured by
defendants.152 Therefore, the court allowed plaintiff’s claims and
deferred ruling on the standing question until class
certification.153
Conversely, “[w]here the alleged misrepresentations or
accused products are dissimilar, courts tend to dismiss claims to
the extent they are based on products not purchased.”154 For
example, in Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co.,155 the court found that the
plaintiffs lacked standing over the unpurchased products because
they challenged a wide range of Trader Joe’s products, including
cookies and ricotta cheese, which bore insufficient similarity.156
Accordingly, the district courts adopting the first application
of the second approach have allowed the named plaintiff to assert
claims relating to unpurchased products where the products were
“substantially similar” to those actually purchased by the named
plaintiff.157 In doing so, although they failed to expressly note it,

similarity where different ice creams used the same labels for all of the products and
plaintiffs challenged this mislabeling practice across different product flavors).
147
Brown, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
148
No. C-09-00927 RMW, 2010 WL 94265, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010).
149
Id.
150
Id at *3.
151
Id. at *1, *3.
152
Id. at *3.
153
See id. (“[T]he court will defer ruling on the issue until the class certification
stage and denies defendant’s motion to dismiss in its entirety.”).
154
Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 881, 891 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
155
2012 WL 5458396 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012).
156
Id. at *1, *4–5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012); see also Stephensen v. Neutrogena,
No. C 12-0426 PJH, 2012 WL 8527784, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2012).
157
Brown, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
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these courts were conducting a Rule 23 analysis at the motion to
dismiss stage. The courts were addressing whether there was
class standing by analyzing whether the named plaintiff’s claims
were adequate, common, and typical of the claims of the putative
class members.158 While these courts generally failed to classify
the issue as one of class standing, which is properly determined
at the Rule 23 stage, the use of the “sufficiently similar” language
shows that the inquiry was one in the same.
Alternatively, the courts that have adopted the second
application of the second approach to this procedural issue have
explicitly noted that the determination is one meant for the Rule
23 class certification stage. Rather than examining whether
there are “sufficient[] similar[ities]” to survive a motion to
dismiss, these courts hold that the motion to dismiss must be
denied, because whether the named plaintiff can assert claims
related to the product purchased by unnamed class members is
always a question for a Rule 23 class certification analysis.159
The Eastern District of New York adopted this approach in
In re Frito-Lay North America, Inc. All Natural Litigation.160
There, plaintiffs brought a putative class action grounded in
various federal and state-law claims, alleging defendants FritoLay North America, Inc., and PepsiCo, Inc., deceptively labeled
their products.161
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged defendants
marketed various products as “All Natural” when, in fact, the
products contained unnatural, genetically-modified organisms.162
Plaintiffs alleged they paid a premium price for the products as
compared to similar products not bearing an “All Natural”
label.163 Accordingly, plaintiffs asserted that they relied on the
defendants’ misleading and deceptive misrepresentations as to
the “All Natural” quality of their products and that they would
not have bought the products absent such representations.164
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging
plaintiffs did not have standing to bring claims related to the “All
Natural” labeling of eight products that none of the named
158

See supra text accompanying notes 104–08.
See, e.g., In re Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. All Natural Litigation, No. 12-MD-2413
(RRM), 2013 WL 4647512, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013).
160
Id.
161
Id. at *1.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
159
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plaintiffs had purchased.165 In response, the plaintiffs argued
that the question was not one of Article III standing, but instead
a question of “class standing,” and therefore should be considered
on a motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23 rather
than on a motion to dismiss.166
The Eastern District agreed, holding it was a question of
class standing and should therefore be addressed at the class
certification stage of the litigation.167 The court noted that
because the plaintiffs did purchase certain products, and were
directly injured accordingly, the plaintiffs clearly had alleged
sufficient facts to show that, individually, they had Article III
standing.168 The court reasoned the real question was “whether
plaintiffs [could] represent putative class members who suffered
a similar injury arising out of the class members’ purchases of
products that the plaintiffs did not purchase.”169 The court found
it “remains undisputed that plaintiffs lack Article III standing to
assert claims arising out of products that they themselves did not
purchase.”170 Therefore, the court noted that had plaintiffs not
purchased a product and been injured, they would not have had
Article III standing.171 However, the court found that “once there
is at least one named plaintiff for every named defendant ‘who
can assert a claim directly against that defendant, . . . [Article
III] standing is satisfied and only then will the inquiry shift to a
class action analysis.’ ”172 In this case, because there was only
one defendant, and the named plaintiff could, himself, assert a

165

Id. at *10.
Id. at *10–11.
167
Id. at *12–13. The court did, however, note that “[e]ven if the inquiry here is
one of Article III standing, there are cases conferring Article III standing to pursue
claims on behalf of purchasers of products the named plaintiffs did not purchase so
long as the products are ‘sufficiently similar’ to those the plaintiffs did purchase.” Id.
at *12. However, the court noted that even these cases seem to suggest the question
is truly one of class standing. Id.
168
Id. at *11.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health &
Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 504 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir.
2007)).
166
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claim against that defendant based on that plaintiff’s purchase,
Article III standing was satisfied, and the inquiry became one of
class standing.173
Therefore, in In re Frito-Lay North America, Inc. All Natural
Litigation,174 the Eastern District held that because the named
plaintiffs satisfied Article III standing at the motion to dismiss
stage, they could pursue claims on behalf of putative class
members against products the named plaintiffs did not purchase.
There, what was being questioned was whether the plaintiffs’
injuries were sufficiently similar to those of the class members; a
question that really concerned the named plaintiffs’ ability to
adequately represent the interests of the class. Such an inquiry
is the objective of a Rule 23 class certification motion.175
Most recently, in Jovel v. I-Health, Inc.,176 the Eastern
District once again determined this issue is better addressed at
the class certification stage of litigation. There, however, the
court seemed to combine the class standing classification of In re
Frito Lay North America, Inc. All Natural Litigation and the
“sufficiently similar” language of the previous district court
decisions adopting the second approach.177 There, defendant
i-Health manufactured, sold, and distributed BrainStrong

173
Id. at *13. The court relied heavily on the Second Circuit’s decision in NECAIBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co. Id. at *10. In NECA-IBEW
Health & Welfare Fund, the court reasoned that once the plaintiff had established
Article III and statutory standing, the inquiry shifted “from the elements of
justiciability to the ability of the named representative to ‘fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.’ ” 693 F.3d 145, 159 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975) and FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4)).
174
2013 WL 4647512.
175
Outside of New York, several California district courts have likewise found
that a plaintiff’s ability to assert claims relating to products that were not purchased
by the plaintiff is a question better suited for class certification. See, e.g., Cardenas
v. NBTY, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 984, 992 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (holding “whether Plaintiff
may be allowed to present claims on behalf of purchasers of the remaining” products
was a decision which would be analyzed solely under Rule 23); Dorfman v.
Nutramax Labs., Inc., No. 13cv0873 WQH (RBB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136949, at
*22 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013) (holding that any differences in the product purchased
by the plaintiff and those purchased by the putative class members is an issue “best
addressed at the class certification stage rather than the motion to dismiss stage”);
Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, 280 F.R.D. 524, 530 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(“[W]hether a class representative ‘may be allowed to present claims on behalf of
others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on
an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation.’ ”).
176
12-CV-5614 (JG), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139661 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013).
177
Id. at *28–31.
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products—a line of four dietary supplements—throughout the
United States.178 The products were advertised to “support[]
brain health and function in children and adults.”179 After
purchasing one of the products and using it as advertised,
plaintiff alleged that her child’s brain health was not supported
as represented.180 Accordingly, because of i-Health’s deceptive
representations, the plaintiff brought a putative class action
alleging violations of state consumer protection laws, asserting
claims against three of the four BrainStrong products.181
i-Health moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that plaintiff
did not have standing to bring claims relating to the two
BrainStrong products that she did not purchase.182
The court held that “there [we]re sufficient similarities
among i-Health’s products that any concerns regarding the
differences c[ould] be addressed at the class certification
stage.”183 The court noted that the products had similarities in
packaging and labeling, and that any differences in the
advertisements were immaterial.184 The court also focused on the
fact that all of the products had the same core active
ingredient.185 In doing so, the court seemed to formulate a hybrid
application of the class standing classification and the
“sufficiently similar” language. The court concluded that because
the products were sufficiently similar, any differences between
them should be sorted out at the class certification stage.186
Accordingly, there is a disparity in how district courts have
dealt with a named plaintiff seeking to assert claims relating to
products purchased by putative class members. The first, the
minority approach, is to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss
claims relating to unpurchased products. The second, the
majority approach, is to allow the claims to continue because
such a determination is meant to be determined during the Rule
23 class certification stage of litigation. However, within the
majority approach exist two different, confusing applications for
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *27.
Id. at *30.
Id.
Id. at *31.
Id. at *30.
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determining when claims relating to unpurchased products will
survive defendant’s motion to dismiss. The first application
allows the plaintiff’s claims to survive defendant’s motion to
dismiss if the purchased products and unpurchased products and
their accompanying misrepresentations are “sufficiently
similar.”187 Whereas the second application provides that the
claims must survive because the determination is always one of
class standing, not suited for a motion to dismiss, but rather, a
Rule 23 class certification analysis. Finally, at least two courts
have used what appears to be a mixture of the two applications,
using both the class standing classification and the “sufficiently
similar” language, and holding that where the products are
sufficiently similar, the claims will survive the motion to dismiss
stage and proceed to a Rule 23 class certification analysis.188
III. FINDING A SOLUTION
This Note proposes a test for determining when, in a
putative consumer protection class action in federal court, a
named plaintiff’s claims relating to products he did not himself
purchase, but which were purchased by unnamed members of the
putative class, will survive defendant’s motion to dismiss. By
analyzing the ways that district courts have addressed this
procedural issue, this Note determines which solution best
comports with contemporary standing doctrine, the rationale
underlying consumer protection statutes, and public policy,
generally.
As federal courts continue to maintain different approaches,
the split of authority among district courts is only widening.
Because CAFA has enabled consumers to bring their putative
class actions in the federal courts, this issue is presenting itself
more frequently. In fact, there are numerous cases awaiting
decision right now that will address it.189 For these reasons, the
187

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See Quinn v. Walgreen Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 533, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding
that because “there are substantial similarities between all of defendants’
[products], and the alleged misrepresentations on the labels of the [products] are
nearly identical . . . the appropriate time to consider whether plaintiffs can bring
claims on behalf of purchasers of all of the various [products] is at the class
certification stage, not on a motion to dismiss”).
189
See, e.g., Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Dimuro v.
Estee Lauder, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-01789 (D. Conn. Dec. 20, 2012), 2012 WL 6633707;
Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, In Re
188
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issue is ripe for review. This Note proposes that, unquestionably,
the second approach is the correct judicial response. However,
this Note submits that the more appropriate way to address the
issue is to adopt a multi-faceted test, like that adopted by the
Eastern District of New York in Jovel v. I-Health, Inc.,190 rather
than simply automatically deferring to the Rule 23 stage of
litigation.
Because of the inconsistent judgments, American consumers
are at a severe disadvantage. The same claims brought by
identical plaintiffs are being adjudicated differently in courts
across the country. Worst of all, the inconsistent judgments are
not based on differences inherent in those courts’ applications of
certain states’ different substantive laws. These inconsistent
rulings are based on district courts’ interpretations of
contemporary standing doctrine.
Accordingly, a change is
necessary so that plaintiffs who bring identical claims will not be
subjected to different outcomes simply because of the district in
which they initiate their suit.
In determining which solution to this procedural issue best
comports with contemporary standing doctrine, the purpose of
consumer protection statutes, and public policy, it is important to
immediately note that the first approach—granting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss and denying the plaintiff’s claims
relating to unpurchased products—is the least appropriate. In a
putative consumer class action, once the named plaintiff has
plausibly alleged personal injury, thereby satisfying Article III
and statutory standing, determining whether the named
plaintiff’s claims are representative of the unnamed putative
class members’ claims is a question of class standing.
Accordingly, because class standing is an issue addressed in a
Rule 23 class certification analysis, the plaintiff’s claims should
survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss. However, because the
second approach is mired with inconsistent and confusing district
court decisions, it is necessary to employ a test for better
determining when a named plaintiff’s claims relating to
unpurchased products will survive a defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
L’Oreal Wrinkle Cream Marketing Practices Litigation, No. 2:12-CV-3571 (D.N.J.
July 8, 2013), 2013 WL 3941892; Second Amended Class Action Complaint, Guilin v.
Walgreens Co., No. 11-CV-07763 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2012), 2012 WL 6045111.
190
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139661 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013).
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This Note proposes such a test, which builds off the analysis
in Jovel v. I-Health, Inc.191 to remedy the current inconsistencies
in the second approach. The proposed test, like Jovel, allows the
putative consumer protection class action to survive a
defendant’s motion to dismiss where the named plaintiff’s claims
relating to products purchased by the putative class members but
not purchased by the plaintiff himself are “sufficiently similar” to
those products actually purchased by the named plaintiff.
However, in addition to adopting this Jovel test, the proposed
test adds another component. To promote consistency and
enhance knowledge of the law, the test identifies certain
situations that have arisen frequently in the cases addressing
this issue, and presumes the existence of sufficient similarity
between the products in such situations.
A.

The First Approach Does Not Comport with Contemporary
Standing Doctrine or the Policy Underlying Consumer
Protection Statutes

There are several reasons why the first approach—granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss and denying plaintiff’s claims
against unpurchased products—is the incorrect approach to this
issue.
The primary reason is the underlying purpose of
contemporary standing doctrine: ensuring that a real case or
controversy exists.192 In these cases, a real case or controversy
absolutely exists. A plaintiff is seeking to certify a class, the
members of which have all been harmed after purchasing
products with misrepresentations. The only issue here is that
the named plaintiff does not technically have an identical claim
as the other putative class members because the named plaintiff
purchased an immaterially different product.
Even if the
misrepresentations are identical and the products are similar,
the issue arises only because the products are not the same.
Accordingly, if there were a named plaintiff for each separate
product, there would be no issue at all. But, simply because one
named plaintiff asserts claims related to products purchased by
unnamed class members, district courts adopting this approach
hold the claims related to unpurchased products must be
dismissed. By essentially preventing the action from proceeding
191
192

Id.
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 78, § 2:6.
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for no reason other than the name that appears on the complaint,
these courts undermine the purpose of standing doctrine, which
is to ensure that plaintiffs who have personally suffered injury
are provided a mode of redress.
This approach is also incorrect because it confuses Article III
standing with class standing. As previously discussed, once the
named plaintiff has plausibly alleged personal injury, thereby
satisfying Article III and statutory standing, determining
whether the named plaintiff’s claims are representative of the
unnamed putative class members’ claims is a question of class
standing. Rule 23 is specifically designed to address any
concerns about the relationship between a class representative
and members of the class.193 Therefore, if a plaintiff has satisfied
her individual standing requirement so as to establish a real case
or controversy, then Rule 23 will address any concerns that arise
due to the nature of the class action mechanism.194
Additionally,
because
standing
decisions
invoke
constitutional concerns, courts addressing this issue should
choose the less complex class certification analysis over that of
contemporary standing doctrine.195 Class certification “focuses a
court on pragmatic factors in a familiar and accessible manner”
and allows the court to adjudicate the issue in a
“nonconstitutional manner.”196
This will only simplify the
proceedings by eliminating any unnecessary constitutional
litigation.
Aside from contemporary standing concerns, this first
approach also does not comport with the rationale underlying
consumer fraud statutes. As previously discussed, the goal of
consumer protection statutes is to better enable consumers to
bring causes of action for alleged unfair practices.197 The statutes
were designed to lessen the burden on the individual consumer
and place the onus on the major corporation. If the objective is

193

Id.
Id.
195
See id. (noting standing decisions are “abstract and often politicized”); see
also Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (“Where a case
in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal
Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed from without
important reasons.”).
196
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 78, § 2:6.
197
See supra text accompanying notes 55–58.
194
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for the consumer to have redress, making it difficult for a
plaintiff to bring a class action defeats the purpose of these
statutes.
B.

The District Courts’ Inconsistent and Confusing Applications
of the Second Approach Must Be Reconciled

The second approach complies with contemporary standing
doctrine and the policy underlying consumer protection statutes;
however, the inconsistent and confusing decisions of the district
courts need to be consolidated for uniform application and
consistent results.
The first application of the second approach provides that
where the named plaintiff’s claims relate to unpurchased
products
that
are
“sufficiently
similar”
or
have
misrepresentations that are “sufficiently similar” to the product
that the plaintiff actually purchased, the plaintiff has standing,
and such claims will survive defendant’s motion to dismiss.198
While this approach correctly holds that the named plaintiff’s
claims should proceed past the defendant’s motion to dismiss, it
fails to conclude that such a standing determination is the
purview of a Rule 23 class certification analysis.199 Instead, the
court
simply
finds
that
where
the
products
and
misrepresentations are sufficiently similar the plaintiff has
standing, and the claims may proceed to the next stage of the
litigation. In doing so, the court is addressing, at the motion to
dismiss stage of the litigation, that which is supposed to be
reserved for the Rule 23 class certification analysis: whether the
named plaintiff has adequately established class standing.
The second application of the second approach provides that,
where a plaintiff plausibly alleges individual injury, any
determination of whether his or her claims against the products
of the putative class members will survive defendant’s motion to
dismiss must be analyzed at the Rule 23 class certification stage
of litigation. This means that whether the two claims are similar
enough would automatically be determined by the Rule 23
analysis. However, such a rule would consequently undermine
the efficacy of defendant’s motion to dismiss. All that a plaintiff
would have to allege was an intention to certify a class, and the
198
199

See supra text accompanying notes 145–53.
See supra text accompanying notes 87–96.
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complaint could proceed past the motion to dismiss stage of the
litigation. A plaintiff who adequately alleges individual standing
should not go unchecked in what additional claims he or she can
allege.200 This concern was recently remedied by the use of a
mixed approach.201
The district courts’ inconsistent and confusing applications of
the second approach were simplified through the creation of a
mixed approach. In Jovel v I-Health, Inc.,202 the Eastern District
found the plaintiff’s standing to assert claims against
unpurchased products was a determination for a Rule 23 class
certification analysis.203 However, the court also incorporated the
“sufficiently similar” language into its analysis.204 In doing so,
the court formulated a hybrid application of the inconsistent
decisions of the second approach, and one, which this Note
advocates, that is the most appropriate method for dealing with
this issue. Such a test declares that the standing inquiry is one
better suited for the class certification analysis, while also
ensuring a plaintiff may not assert claims against products that
have nothing to do with his alleged injury.
C.

The Proposed Test Will Comport with Contemporary
Standing Doctrine and Effectuate the Policy of Consumer
Protection Statutes, While Also Protecting Against Overly
Broad Suits

This Note’s proposed hybrid approach will better achieve the
objectives of contemporary standing and consumer protection
doctrines, while also ensuring that overly broad claims will not
survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss. The proposed test
adopts the rule set out in Jovel. Accordingly, the test permits the
named plaintiff’s claims relating to unpurchased products and

200
For example, the plaintiff should not be able to assert a class member’s claim
for misrepresentation in relation to cleaning products when he has only personally
been injured by alleged misrepresentations on a dietary supplement. Although the
plaintiff has personally suffered an injury, the injury cannot be said to be
representative of the injury felt by the unnamed putative class member. If allowed,
this would circumvent the efficacy of defendant’s motion to dismiss, allowing the
plaintiff to serve as representative for claims that bear no relation to his or her own.
201
See Jovel v. I-Health, Inc., 12-CV-5614 (JG), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139661,
at *30–31 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) (demonstrating the mixed approach).
202
Id.
203
Id. at *30.
204
Id.
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allows the suit to proceed past the motion to dismiss stage of the
litigation, but only where the unpurchased products are
“sufficiently similar” to the products that the named plaintiff
actually did purchase. However, in addition to the Jovel rule, the
test highlights three situations where the named plaintiff’s
claims are presumed to be sufficiently similar to those of the
unnamed members of the putative class, so that such claims will
survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss. The three situations
are: (i) when the product over which standing is sought is of the
same product line as that product which was actually purchased
by the named plaintiff; (ii) when the products have common
ingredients or components and such ingredients or components
are the primary or material selling points of the products; and
(iii) when the plaintiff does not allege injury based solely on the
alleged misrepresentations but rather on the diminution in value
resulting from the product defect that exists in all products, such
that if certification is granted, the proposed class would include
plaintiffs with personal standing to raise the claims.
The test adopts the second approach’s determination that the
standing of the named plaintiff to assert claims over products he
or she did not purchase is a matter properly addressed at the
Rule 23 class certification stage of the litigation. This test also
comports with contemporary standing doctrine, because the issue
being decided is whether or not the named plaintiff has class
standing as opposed to Article III standing, which is the purpose
of a Rule 23 class certification analysis.205
However, to protect defendants from frivolous or overly
broad suits, the plaintiff’s claims will only survive defendant’s
motion to dismiss in certain limited circumstances. A named
plaintiff’s claims against products he or she did not actually
purchase will only survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss
when the unpurchased products are “sufficiently similar” to the
product actually purchased by the named plaintiff. The rationale
underlying this approach is that, although an analysis of the
similarity of the claims is better suited for a Rule 23 class
certification, a named plaintiff should not survive a defendant’s
motion to dismiss when he or she asserts claims against
unpurchased products that have no cognizable similarity or
nexus with the product that injured the named plaintiff.
205

See supra text accompanying notes 88–92.
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Allowing this would cause undue hardship to defendants because
a named plaintiff could assert claims against every product in the
defendant’s inventory, and then survive the defendant’s motion
to dismiss simply because, in a class action, the question is better
dealt with at the Rule 23 stage. To protect against such an
occurrence, the proposed test identifies three situations that have
arisen frequently in the cases addressing this issue, where courts
have allowed the claims to survive defendants’ motions to
dismiss. The test presumes that in these specific enumerated
situations the named plaintiff’s claims are sufficiently similar to
those of the unnamed putative class members.
The first situation is where the unpurchased product is of
the same product line as the product that was actually purchased
by the named plaintiff. As an example, assume that a plaintiff
was injured when he bought a dietary supplement, which
advertised and represented its ability to improve eyesight. If the
plaintiff sues alleging that his sight was not improved, the
plaintiff should be able to assert claims on behalf of the unnamed
putative class members against a product in the same product
line that he did not purchase, but which is sold by the same
defendant and similarly advertised and represented to improve
eyesight. Here, the unpurchased product would simply be a
dietary supplement with minor variations to the product that the
named plaintiff actually purchased. Because the injury will be
identical regardless of which product was purchased, the named
plaintiff’s claims should survive to the class certification stage of
the litigation. That said, the converse is also true; plaintiff
should not be able to assert claims relating to defendant’s
misrepresentations concerning a weight loss dietary supplement
that he never purchased. This is somewhat obvious, and ensures
that only in cases where the products are actually similar, will
the claims against unpurchased products survive defendant’s
motion to dismiss and proceed to the Rule 23 analysis. This
scenario works to protect the defendant against overly broad
suits, so the defendant will not be forced to incur litigation costs
resulting from the suit automatically proceeding to the Rule 23
analysis.
The second part of the test further limits the circumstances
where a named plaintiff would be able to assert claims related to
unpurchased products. The requirement that the products have
components or ingredients that are common and are the selling
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point of the product line bolsters the “sufficiently similar”
requisite. Returning to the hypothetical, assume that the dietary
supplement, which was advertised for its ability to improve
eyesight, had as its active ingredient beta-carotene. Assume also
that the plaintiff seeks to assert claims relating to another
product which is part of a different product line than the product
plaintiff purchased. The product in the other product line is
similarly advertised as improving eyesight, but it contains triple
the amount of beta-carotene as the product that the plaintiff
purchased. It also has additional ingredients such as Vitamin C.
Can the plaintiff assert claims against this product, which was
purchased by unnamed members of the putative class?
The second part of our test is designed to address situations
where products are not part of the same product line,206 but are
sold for the same underlying purpose and differ in nonmaterial or
insubstantial ways.
Accordingly, in the hypothetical, the
plaintiff should be able to assert claims against the second
product because, although it is technically different than the
product plaintiff actually purchased, it was purchased by the
unnamed class members for the same reason: improving
eyesight. Additionally, both products’ active ingredient is betacarotene. Whether the products are too different from each other
for class action purposes, simply because of the added Vitamin C,
is a determination that should be addressed at the Rule 23 class
certification stage. Even though the strengths of the products
are different and the ingredients are not identical, the products
were bought for the same purpose and advertised to do the same
thing. Therefore, such claims should survive defendants’ motions
to dismiss. This situation captures instances where the named
plaintiff and the class members purchase different products but
the differences relate to minor, incidental variations in the
composition of the products.207

206
See Product Line Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/product%20line (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (defining product
line as “a group of closely related commodities made by the same process and for the
same purpose and differing only in style, model, or size”).
207
The proposed test uses the “ingredient or component” language to capture
situations where the products are not dietary supplements or other things designed
for human consumption, that is, the 3-D feature of a new Samsung 3-D television
model.
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The final instance where courts should presume products are
“sufficiently similar” and allow claims to proceed to class
certification is where the named plaintiff does not allege injury
based solely on alleged misrepresentations, but rather, on the
diminution in value resulting from the product defect that exists
in all of the products. This situation focuses on the actual injury
incurred and, thereby, allows the plaintiff to assert claims
against unpurchased products when his actual injury is the same
as the injury that the unnamed class members will allege. This
ensures that if certification is granted, the proposed class will
include plaintiffs with personal standing to raise the claims.208
This component of the test derives from the analysis in Donohue
v. Apple, Inc.209 There, a consumer brought a putative class
action alleging that a defect in his iPhone’s signal meter violated
state consumer protection laws.210 The plaintiff asserted claims
against Apple, Inc. because of his iPhone, but also sought to
assert claims on behalf of purchasers of other iPhone models.211
The court found that the plaintiff had standing to assert such
claims because the plaintiff did not allege injury based solely on
Apple’s alleged misrepresentations, but on the diminution in
value caused by the defect itself, which “Apple ha[d] already
admitted existed in every iPhone model at issue in th[e] case.”212
Accordingly, the court focused on the fact that the injury was
identical across the different iPhone models and all the members
of the class would allege the same injury.
To understand this, let us again return to our hypothetical.
Plaintiff’s injury is that he purchased the particular dietary
supplement, which did not perform as promised. However,
looking at the injury in a broader scope, the injury is also that
plaintiff bought a specific dietary product from defendant, which,
because it did not perform as promised, is worthless. The class
members similarly suffered an injury when they purchased a
different particular dietary product, which did not perform as
promised. Aside from the specific injury of purchasing the
product, which failed to perform as advertised, the class
members were likewise generally injured because the dietary
208
209
210
211
212

See Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
Id. at 913.
Id. at 916–18.
Id.
Id. at 922.
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product that they purchased became worthless when it did not
perform as promised. Accordingly, because the diminution in
value resulting from the product defect caused the same type of
injury in relation to all plaintiffs, regardless of which product
was purchased, the claims are sufficiently similar to survive the
motion to dismiss. This situation is designed to cover instances
where, unlike the first and second situations, the products are
not of the same product line and do not necessarily share
common ingredients or components.
This Note’s proposed test promotes the underlying rationale
of consumer protection statutes by better enabling consumers to
seek a remedy for their alleged injuries.213 Because consumer
protection statutes are designed to place the burden on the
corporation that allegedly utilizes unfair or deceptive practices,
allowing the suit to proceed to the Rule 23 analysis is consistent
with this approach.214 The rationale behind consumer protection
statutes is to create a mode of redress for the individual
consumer by allowing that individual to sue the corporation
directly, rather than having to rely on a state or federal
enforcement agency.215 The idea was that this would place
consumers—average
citizens
engaging
in
business
transactions—on the same playing field as massive corporations,
where the consumer would no longer be inherently
disadvantaged when bargaining with corporations or industries.
Allowing the plaintiff to assert claims relating to unpurchased
products enables the plaintiff to address more than one unfair or
deceptive practice in the suit. The corporation engaging in such
practices is, therefore, more likely to be held accountable, and the
individual will be better able to redress every alleged injury.
D. The Proposed Test Advances Public Policy Objectives
The proposed test has the added benefit of comporting with
two public policy objectives. Namely, the test will promote
efficiency and uniformity within the federal court system.
The proposed test promotes efficiency, one of the principal
tenets of the federal system. “A federal judicial system that is
inefficient . . . endangers the basic principles of our national

213
214
215

See supra Part I.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.
See supra text accompanying notes 61–64.
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justice resource: quality resolution of our country’s most
fundamental, important, and complex legal concerns within the
context of the well-balanced governmental fabric of
federalism.”216 Because the alleged unfair or deceptive practices
of corporations usually relate to a consumer’s purchase of a
single product, the damages relating to that individual injury
will not be great. Accordingly, consumer protection class actions
allow plaintiffs to accumulate their alleged injuries into a single
action with the potential for sizeable damages. It is in the best
interest of the federal system to promote this type of action
because the class action mechanism effectively consolidates
individual actions.217 The alternative would be multiple suits
alleging injury due to the exact same misrepresentation simply
found on different products.
The other, more significant, policy implication of the
proposed test would be the promotion of uniformity within the
federal courts. The importance of uniformity is a fundamental
principle enshrined in the Constitution itself218 and favored in
the federal courts.219 A federal system demands both uniformity
in the interpretation of the substantive law and uniformity in
procedure.220 The principal argument for uniformity is that
“citizens of different jurisdictions should not be subjected to
different interpretations of the same law.”221 However, there are
numerous other interests that are also served by uniformity.
Uniformity ensures the predictability of the law, thereby
enabling “a legal regime to achieve its instrumental purposes.”222
Without the uniform application of the law, “it is impossible for
law to influence primary behavior effectively when individuals
are subjected to inconsistent and conflicting signals about the
216
Judge Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, Federal Courts at the Crossroads:
Adapt or Lose!, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 211, 213 (1994).
217
See supra text accompanying notes 73–74.
218
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States.”).
219
See Sara Fawk, Note, Immigration Law–Eligibility for Section 212(c) Relief
from Deportation: Is It the Ground or the Offense, the Dancer or the Dance?, 32 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 459 (2010) (“The federal courts favor uniformity and
consistency to support the structure and function of the court system.”).
220
Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 378 (2011).
221
Id. at 378 n.383.
222
Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 850 (1994).
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law’s meaning.”223
However, most importantly, “[n]ational
uniformity of federal law ensures that courts treat similarly
situated litigants equally—a result often considered a hallmark
of fairness in a regime committed to the rule of law.”224 Without
such uniformity, a plaintiff may be able to bring suit in one state,
but fail in another. While there exist many other justifications
for uniformity in the federal court system,225 this inconsistency
serves as an “impetus to forum shop,”226 and is therefore strongly
disfavored in our judicial system.227
Currently, district courts across the country address this
procedural issue differently. If a suit is brought in Illinois, the
named plaintiff will be deemed to have no standing to assert
claims relating to unpurchased products. Within California, how
this issue will be adjudicated depends on where you file suit, as
the state’s district courts are split on the issue.228 In New York,
as long as a plaintiff establishes Article III standing, the class
standing question is not decided at the motion to dismiss stage,
as it is properly addressed at a later stage of the litigation.229
However, district courts within New York apply different tests,
with one court employing the “sufficiently similar” language.
Accordingly, district courts across the country are anything but
uniform. The approach this Note proposes would promote a
uniform response to these cases, and ensure that district courts
will no longer differ. Instead, in a putative consumer protection
class action, the named plaintiff’s ability to assert claims relating
to unpurchased products would be a question of class standing
and, as long as the products are “sufficiently similar,” would be
an issue meant to be resolved at the Rule 23 class certification
stage of the litigation.

223
Id. (quoting Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court
Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REV. 991, 995 (1987)).
224
Id. at 852.
225
See id. at 850–55 (discussing extensively the interests served through the
promotion of uniformity).
226
Fawk, supra note 219, at 459–60.
227
See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1681
(1990) (discussing the judicial and legislative branches’ opposition to “the evil of
forum shopping”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
228
See Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889–91 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (collecting cases).
229
See In re Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. All Natural Litigation, No. 12-MD-2413
(RRM), 2013 WL 4647512, at *11–12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013).
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CONCLUSION
Consumer class actions will only become increasingly more
relevant in today’s society, as these actions are the most
convenient and efficient sources of relief for individual consumers
who are wronged by large corporations. This Note concludes that
a named consumer protection class action plaintiff’s claims
relating to products purchased by unnamed members of the
putative class should survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss
when there is “sufficient similarity” between the unpurchased
products and the product plaintiff actually purchased, because
such a determination is better suited for the Rule 23 class
certification stage of the litigation. To promote consistency and
enhance knowledge of the law, this Note’s proposed test identifies
certain situations that have arisen frequently in the cases
addressing this issue, and presumes there exists sufficient
similarity between the products in such situations. Adoption of
the proposed test will better enable a uniform application of
standing doctrine, help reconcile the inconsistent decisions of
district courts across the country, and ensure that courts comport
with contemporary standing doctrine, the rationale underlying
consumer protection statutes, and public policy concerns.

